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Abstract—In recent years, the problem of Position, Navigation
and Timing (PNT) resiliency has received significant attention
due to an increasing awareness on threats and the vulnerability
of the current GNSS signals. Several proposed solutions make
uses of cryptography to protect against spoofing. A limitation of
cryptographic techniques is that they introduce a communication
and processing computation overhead and may impact the
performance in terms of availability and continuity for GNSS
users.
This paper introduces autonomous non cryptographic anti-
spoofing mechanisms, that exploit semi-codeless receiver tech-
niques to detect spoofing for signals with a component making
use of spreading code encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the resiliency of positioning, navigation and
timing has received significant attention due to an increasing
awareness of spoofing threats and the vulnerability of the
current GNSS to this type of deliberate interference [1]. A
significant body of research has focused on cryptographic
techniques to defend against spoofing, both at data (symbol)
[2]–[5] and signal layers (spreading code) [6]–[8]. Such
techniques focus on providing the capability for authenticating
the origin of the navigation message and providing assurance
on the authenticity of ranging signals through methods such
as spreading code encryption.
A limitation of cryptographic techniques is the significant
overhead and impact the management of keys can have on
the availability and continuity operations for GNSS users.
Furthermore, compromise and rapid revocation can have
devastating impacts on users, especially where users are
dependent on the signal-in-space or an ancillary data channel
for the dissemination of updated keying information.
This paper introduces an autonomous anti-spoofing tech-
nique, by using adapted semi-codeless receiver techniques
to detect spoofing for signals with a component that uses
spreading code encryption; however, the technique does not
require keys to be installed on the receiver. The proposed
technique is described in relation to the GPS L1 signal with
C/A and GPS P(Y) signal components; although the technique
is expected to be applicable to other signals as well.
The technique significantly limits the degrees of freedom of
an attacker and provides the capability to detect the illegitimate
signals from legitimate ones in a hostile environment.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II provides an
introduction on GNSS authentication; III provides an overview
of the Security Code Estimation and Replay (SCER) attack
and presents results based on experimentation performed with
real signals in both static and dynamic scenarios; and Section
IV introduces semi-codeless techniques for anti-spoofing, high-
level attack strategies, and describes the proposed autonomous
anti-spoofing technique with a theoretical evaluation of per-
formance. The paper concludes with a discussion on future
work.
II. BACKGROUND ON GNSS AUTHENTICATION
The level of assurance of a Position, Velocity and Time
(PVT) computed using GNSS signals is dependent on that of
the GNSS receiver ranging and PVT computation functions and
the capability of the receiver to differentiate between authentic
and counterfeit signals. Mechanisms can be provided within
the GNSS signal at both the signal and data levels to achieve
this:
• Signal level protection, allows the receiver to determine
whether the received signal originated from its claimed
source or whether it is a forgery. Attacks at the signal level
can affect the PVT by targeting the receiver’s ranging
function:
– Signal forgery: generation of arbitrary navigation
signals (e.g. signal spoofing using a signal generator,
including reception of legitimate GNSS signals and
replay of navigation message over simulated signals
so that they appear legitimate to the receiver); and
– Signal relay: recording and rebroadcast of RF signals
(e.g. meaconing).
• Data level protection, allows the GNSS receiver to deter-
mine whether the received navigation message originated
from its claimed source, and whether integrity of the
message is assured (i.e. message has not been altered
by unauthorised or unknown means). Such protections
are referred to as data authentication and cryptographic
integrity protection. Attacks at the data level can affect
the PVT by targeting the receiver’s PVT computation
function, providing an incorrect navigation message.
For a more comprehensive analysis on the vulnerabilities of
GNSS to intentional attacks, we refer the reader to [1].
Data level protection can be achieved with information
security techniques usually referred to as Navigation Mes-
sage Authentication (NMA) [2]–[5], which foresee the use
of cryptographic mechanisms to authenticate the navigation
message.
The problem of protection at the signal level belongs to the
signal or channel estimation domain, and includes techniques
such as Spreading Code Encryption (SCE) or watermarking
(e.g. by Signal Authentication Sequence (SAS) [6], hidden
markers [7], or Spread Spectrum Security Codes (SSSC) [8]).
Strictly speaking, these are not authentication mechanisms,
rather they increase the complexity and cost of accurately
reproducing a legitimate signal to an intractable level, providing
the receiver with the possibility to distinguish between authentic
and illegitimate signals.
III. SCER
The goal of a SCER attack [9], [10] is to estimate a legitimate
signal in order to generate a spoofed signal with minimal delay
(if any). It is important to note that the estimation need not
be perfect, only good enough so that the reproduced signal is
indistinguishable from the authentic one, when corrupted by
channel and noise at the receiver.
This type of attack represents a general threat that can be
carried out irrespective of the particular cryptographic schemes
employed in the signal (be it data layer schemes: e.g. NMA; or
signal layer schemes: e.g. SCE, SSSC). The victim will receive
both the authentic and spoofed signals below the noise floor;
only after correlation, exploiting the processing gain, does
the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) become sufficiently good to
reliably process the signal.
In order to maximize the information obtained from the
received signals, the detection statistic takes place before the
correlation. Indeed, the correlation process increase the SNR
thus reduce the noise contribution, but the effect of SCER is
noticeable in the different noise distribution. Therefore, the
correlation process itself help hiding the attack. If the SNR of
the attacker is lower than the victim’s, an increase in the noise
variance of the received signal would be noticeable; otherwise,
the receiver noise will hide the attacker.
The attacker’s estimation will improve over time with the
accumulated energy in the symbol (data level) or chip (signal
level). Thus, after an initial transient, the attacker estimation
becomes reliable and the difference between the legitimate
and estimated signals tends to diminish, as we will see in the
following.
In [9] three cases are considered for the estimator function:
two time-invariant, the Maximum Likelihood (ML) and Maxi-
mum A Posteriori (MAP) estimators; and one time-varying, the
Minimum Mean Square Error (MMSE) estimator. The MAP
estimator is optimal for the purpose of minimising the estimate
error probability P [wˆn(t) 6= wn], where wn represents the
security code (Tw being its symbol period) that is unknown
to the attacker. The remainder of this paper will focus on this
approach:
wˆn(t) = µMAP[z] = sgn(z) (1)
The optimal detection strategy for SCER proposed in [9] and
improved in [10], requires knowledge of the attack strategy
used by the receiver; this is not obvious in the real world.
There are a number of issues affecting the performance of the
optimal SCER detection strategy in the real world.
Information of the received signal, which cannot be known
unambiguously, is required. This information includes the
noise variance of the signal. The receiver only has access
to an estimation of the carrier to noise ratio, which to a
certain extent can be influenced by the attacker without being
detected. In order to obtain sufficient information from the
noisy signal, the receiver shall accumulate energy for a long
period. This becomes increasingly difficult in an environment
where measurements of the signal can change rapidly (e.g. due
to multipath or receiver dynamics, especially for low elevation
satellites).
A simpler detection strategy is presented by [11], requiring
less information of the received signal but achieving suboptimal
performance. This proposal stores the first samples of each
unpredictable symbol and evaluates the correlation with a
local replica computed after the demodulation of NMA This
proposal demonstrates the feasibility of detecting SCER attacks
in an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel; however,
performances in realistic real world conditions were not
evaluated.
An extension of this detection strategy includes dividing the
symbols in bins and computing the correlation for each bin
in addition to the evaluation of the accumulated correlation
on the first part of the unpredictable symbols. If the signal
is authentic, every bin will have the same average correlation
value, while if the signal is generated by a SCER attack a
smaller correlation for the initial bins is expected.
A. Results on realistic signals
In order to assess the effectiveness of the SCER attach, an
experiment was devised involving the use of real signals. Two
scenarios were investigated:
1) Static scenario: in this case the signal was acquired
through an omni-directional roof antenna equipped with
a Low Noise Amplifier (LNA) with 30 dB gain and
1 dB Noise Figure (NF). The device used for sampling
and replaying the signal was a HackRF One, an open
source inexpensive Software Defined Radio (SDR) device
[12]. The signal was sampled at 8 MHz with 8-bit I/Q
quantisation.
2) Dynamic scenario: in this case the signal is the clean
dynamic acquisition of the Texas Spoofing Test Battery
(TEXBAT) dataset [13]. This signal was acquired with
a sampling rate of 25 MHz and 16 bit I/Q quantisation,
using a National Instruments PXIe-5663 Vector Signal
Analyzer (VSA). The replay was performed using the
HackRF One SDR.
Both the clean signal recorded from the antenna and the
generated spoofed signals were replayed to a Septentrio
PolaRx4 PRO with standard configuration.
For the sake of simplicity, when replaying the SCER signal,
no authentic signal was present. The goal of the experiment
was to verify weather the increase in the noise introduced
by the attack was enough to prevent a professional receiver
from decoding the navigation data and tracking the signal. The
capture of the tracking loop was not implemented, since this
would increase the complexity of the attack with respect to
timing issues and power levels, but would not affect the attack
strategy.
The employed estimator was the MAP (1). A zero delay
attack was implemented, such that the attacker starts replaying
the signal immediately after receiving the first sample of the
authentic signal. Clearly, this initial estimation is rather poor
and introduces a large amount of noise after the bit transition;
however, this was used to evaluate the performance in the most
challenging setting for the attacker. For the same reason, all 20
PRN repetitions of the C/A symbol were treated as independent
in order to maximise the uncertainty for the attacker and the
introduced noise. Due to the unreliable estimation of the first
samples, a trivial extension of the attack is to start the attack
using a few random samples, in order to generate a signal that
arrives in phase at the correlation peak, producing a completely
synchronised attack. In both experiments, the receiver was able
to decode the navigation data and compute the PVT solution
with the spoofed signal.
Two measures were defined to quantify the effectiveness of
the attack:
• Convergence time: the time needed for the attacker
estimation to stably reach the correct value, which can be
written as:
Ct(n) = max{t ∈ [nTw, (n+1)Tw], s.t. wˆn(t) 6= wn}−nTw
(2)
In Fig. 1a the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF)
of Ct is reported for different elevation angles in the two
scenarios considered.
• Correlation reduction: due to the initial uncertainty in
the attack estimate, the victim receiver will observe a
normalized reduction in the correlation peak:
∆C(n) =
1
Tw
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ (n+1)Tw
nTw
wˆn(t)− wn dt
∣∣∣∣∣ (3)
In Fig. 1b the CDF of CR is reported for different elevation
angles in the two scenarios considered.
It can be seen from Fig. 1a that the time required to achieve
the correct estimation with high probability (e.g. > 95%) is
in the order of 50 µs, which is only a small fraction of the
symbol period for GPS C/A (20 ms) or Galileo E1B (4 ms).
Therefore, the detection strategy should focus on this small
fraction of each unpredictable symbol. Similar results were
obtained in the dynamic scenario.
The long symbol periods of open service GNSS signals,
yield a significant opportunity for the attacker. After reaching a
reliable estimate wˆn(t), the attacker can generate a signal that
almost perfectly resembles the legitimate signal. The attacker
is able to exploit the long integration time at the receiver side
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Figure 1: CDF of (a) convergence time of SCER estimation
and (b) the correlation reduction due to SCER attack in the
static scenario, using MAP estimator.
to hide the initial uncertainty. Moreover, the noise level in the
signal can be artificially increased in order to hide the initial
uncertainty and make it comparable to the noise of the signal.
Due to the long symbol period, the receiver will still track and
demodulate the symbol correctly.
It is worth noting that with more recent signals such as the
Galileo E1B or GPS L1C, which make use of channel coding
to reduce the Bit Error Rate (BER), the attacker may even
have his incorrect estimations corrected by the victim decoder
itself and the FEC redundancy can be leveraged to mount a
Forward Estimation Attack (FEA) attack [14].
An example of the result of the suboptimal detection strategy,
computed in the dynamic scenario discussed above and with the
corresponding zero-delay SCER generated signal with MAP
estimator, is reported in Fig. 2. The bin width is 10 µs in Fig. 2a
- Fig. 2b - Fig. 2c and 100 µs for Fig. 2d. Fig. 2a shows that
for authentic signals all the bins have similar correlations. In
Fig. 2b - Fig. 2d the spoofed signal was used and the tracked
SV signal had a high C/N0. Fig. 2c illustrates the case when
the tracked SV signal had a low C/N0. As expected, the
shorter the bin, the more evident the loss of correlation on the
initial bins; however, the estimate also becomes noisier. For
this reason a trade-off shall be found.
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Figure 2: Suboptimal SCER detection output for the dynamic
scenario. The bins length is 10 µs in (a) - (b) - (c) and 100
µs in (d). The signal reported are: authentic signals with high
C/N0 in (a); spoofed signal with high C/N0 in (b) - (d);
spoofed signal with low C/N0 in (c).
If instead of a zero-delay attack the attacker is able to gain
even a little time advantage by exploiting the receiver clock
uncertainty, then the situation dramatically worsens for the
receiver, which quickly loses the ability to detect the initial
attacker uncertainty at all.
It is also clear from Fig. 2 that it is hard to define an optimal
threshold to detect a spoofing attack for the receiver. Indeed,
the correlation level heavily depends on the C/N0 and thus on
the noise variance of the received signal. As already discussed,
the receiver cannot reliably determine his actual C/N0 nor
check if the estimated value corresponds to the expected one,
predominantly due to effects linked to the environment. While
it might be possible for a static receiver to do this in open sky
conditions (e.g. where a model of the average C/N0 based on
the SV elevation could be used), it is not considered feasible
for dynamic receivers. Furthermore, an attacker could easily
influence the C/N0 estimation by artificially introducing noise
in the generated signal or intentionally flip (invert the phase)
the generated signal for a fraction of the bin duration, to lower
the measured correlation at the receiver side. In this way, the
attacker could reduce the distance between the first bins and the
rest of the symbol, relaxing the need for a perfect estimation
since the beginning.
It is possible to formulate this attack as follows: the victim
receiver makes use of the correlation based detection strategy,
using N bins. Let Cn be the correlation value in the n-th bin
and C = [C1, . . . , CN ]. The detection strategy is to accept the
signal as authentic if C lies within some predetermined set C0.
The attacker, that is supposed to know N , aims at inducing a
flat correlation observed by the receiver for each bin. In order
to do this he can perform a training phase in which he obtains
an estimation of the typical correlation shape by performing a
dry run of the SCER attack and of the detection strategy. In
this way he can achieve an estimation similar to the one in
Fig. 2b. Now the attacker can balance the effect of the attack.
Let us define Ns as the number of samples contained in each
bin, As as the sample amplitude corresponding to the PRN
processed, C1 as the correlation value of the first bin and Cn
as the correlation obtained in the n-th bin. The goal of the
attacker is to reduce the average correlation obtained in the
bin n ≥ 2 to C1. The number of samples that must be flipped,
Nflipn , can be computed as:
Nflipn =
Cn − C1
2C1
The generated signal presents a flat correlation over all the
bins when transmitted; the knowledge of the receiver noise
statistic is not needed, because this will be equally distributed
over all the bins.
Table I details synthetic results and the corresponding
parameters of the attack used to obtain the flat correlation
shown in Fig. 3 in the previously described dynamic scenario.
It is possible to see that artificially flipping only few µs of
signal for each bin it is possible to obtain a flat correlation,
aligned with the first bin. The small number of flipped chips
makes detection very challenging, as the attack cannot be
easily differentiated from effects linked to the environment
(e.g. multipath).
C/N0
Tbin
[µs] ns As C1 Cn Nflipn
Tflip
[µs] %
high 100 2500 27.6 58750 69000 185 7.4 7.4%
high 10 250 27.6 3145 6900 68 2.7 27%
low 100 2500 4 8750 10000 157 6.24 6.2%
low 10 250 4 58750 69000 68 2.7 27%
Table I: Summary of the parameters used to balance the effect
of the SCER attack.
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Figure 3: Suboptimal SCER detection output for the dynamic
scenario with balance attack, corresponding to the signal of
Fig. 2b and Fig. 2c.
The drawback of this attack strategy is the degradation of
the C/N0. In order to reduce this effect, the attacker can
attempt to maximize the average correlation of the first bin
C1, for example, using a time-varying strategy that reduces the
power level of the first samples where he has the maximum
uncertainty, and transmitting the last samples of the first bin
at a higher power.
A method to limit the effectiveness of the attack is to increase
the difficulty of estimating unpredictable symbols. This can be
done by reducing the per symbol energy, either by reducing
the transmission power or the symbol length.
Use of GNSS signals with much lower energy per symbol
(higher chipping rate) can significantly increase the difficulty of
an attack. For example the GPS P(Y) signal, with a chipping
rate 10 times higher than the C/A code. The fact that the
P(Y) spreading code is not public (i.e. modulo-2 sum of P-
code and encrypting code), thus an attacker cannot exploit
the processing gain, and the observed energy per symbol is
significantly reduced. This, coupled with higher chipping rate,
significantly increases the difficulty of the attack.
In the next section, a technique is presented that exploits
the characteristics of the GPS P(Y) signal to restricting the
degrees of freedom for the attacker.
IV. SEMI-CODELESS TECHNIQUES FOR ANTI-SPOOFING
The GPS Course Acquisition (C/A) code is the predominant
signal used by civilian receivers today. Historically, this signal
was used to facilitate the handover process from C/A to P(Y)
code tracking, allowing the receiver to determine the correct P-
code setup parameters and whether spreading code encryption
was active. Today direct acquisition is possible for military
users; however, the handover process is still used by some
semi-codeless receivers in order to obtain multi-frequency
measurements for high-precision applications. The P(Y) code
is a modulo-2 sum of the P-code and W-code, an encrypting
code which is not known to unauthorized users. The P code
chipping rate is 10.23 Mchip/s and the W chipping rate is 20
times lower, 511.5 Kchip/s.
The GPS anti-spoofing mechanism not only limited the
access to the higher-precision precision signal, but also to the
L2 frequency where only the P(Y) signal was transmitted.
In order to have access to a second frequency, providing
the possibility to correct for errors induced by the ionosphere,
semi-codeless techniques allowed carrier phase measurements
to be made on the L2 frequency without knowledge of the
secret W code [15]. Simpler techniques (codeless), involved
squaring of the received signal; however, the squaring operation
also increases the noise (reducing signal to noise ratio). More
sophisticated techniques exploited knowledge of the public P-
code before squaring, maintaining uncertainty on the W-code.
By wiping off the P-code, a 20 times reduction of the signal
bandwidth was obtained. Thus by filtering the signal with a
bandpass filter before the squaring operation, the noise could
be reduced by 13 dB. These techniques are commonly referred
to as P-code aided squaring.
Several additional techniques were proposed in the literature
for combining the P(Y) signal transmitted in both the L1 and
L2 frequency, allowing a further performance improvement.
An interesting feature of these techniques is that instead of
simply squaring the W code, they perform an estimation of
the W-code, using a range of different estimator techniques.
Our work focuses on the first two techniques discussed
as they only require the L1 signal component. We propose
to exploit semi-codeless techniques for the purpose of anti-
spoofing. Extension to multi-frequency receivers is trivial and
may allow better performance to be achieved.
The following assumptions are made for the anti-spoofing
technique presented in this paper:
• The receiver is static, in an open-sky environment tracking
high-elevation satellites. It is assumed that the C/N0 is
relatively stable and that there are limited variation due
to effects of the local environment such as multipath.
• The receiver may be under attack by a spoofer. The task of
the receiver is to determine whether it is under attack and
to provide the capability to distinguish between authentic
and spoofed signals.
• It is assumed that the attacker is not able to block
legitimate signals (e.g. unplugging the victim receiver
antenna and connecting it directly to the spoofer). This
means the technique may not be suitable for applications
where the user himself is the attacker (i.e. self-spoofing).
• It is assumed the signal is unpredictable, such that an
attacker is not able to generate a valid signal before the
transmission of the authentic one from the satellite.
A high-level overview of attack strategies is described below:
• Simple signal generation: a non-sophisticated attacker
may generate the C/A signal component only. The use of
semi-codeless techniques allows the receiver to detect the
lack of the P(Y) component or if the fixed power relations
between the component is verified.
• Complex signal generation: a sophisticated attacker may
generate both C/A and P(Y) components as per the
Interface Control Document (ICD). Because the W code
is not public, the victim is unable to directly check if
the received signal is modulated by the correct W code.
There are some techniques that attempt a cross-check
between receivers [16] or to send the sampled RF signal
to a secure server, which has access to the military code
to perform the PVT computation. If generated signals can
reach the receiver antenna synchronized with the authentic
signals, the detection would be based on the difference
of the W-code. In [16] the idea of extracting the W-
code through a semi-codeless receiver and the comparison
with an estimation coming from a ground infrastructure
equipped with a high gain antenna is presented.
• Meaconing: the simplest way to spoof the signal with the
authentic W code is to perform a meaconing attack. The
attacker receives the signal, waits for a desired delay, and
then retransmits the signal towards the victim receiver.
The signals will not be aligned at the receiver antenna,
thus at least two correlation peaks (both on C/A and P(Y)
) would be found in the acquisition, but with the correct
W-code. In the case of meaconing, ranges can only be
delayed (not anticipated). Furthermore, this type of attack
would result in a spoofed signal that is noisier than the
authentic one.
• SCER: a sophisticated attacker may try to reduce the
noise on the spoofed signal by performing an estimation
of the W-code. Even with this type of attack, a delay
in the generation of the spoofing signal is introduced.
Due to the very short bit duration (about 2µs), the
attacker is constrained in the amount of energy that
can be accumulated in this duration without significant
antenna gain (e.g. steerable dish antennas), see Fig. 1a.
The difference with the SCER attack on the C/A is the
symbol duration and therefore the amount of energy that
can be accumulated. This permits a synchronized attack
by generating random samples before sufficient energy
has been accumulated and hiding this by adding noise
once a reliable estimate has been obtained so that this
type of attack cannot be easily differentiated from noise
induced from the environment. Due to the limited energy
that can be accumulated for a short P(Y) chip duration,
techniques for hiding the attack strategy are very limited.
The short bit duration therefore significantly reduces
the effectiveness of a SCER attack, where significant
additional gain would make an attack significantly more
expensive and potentially visible (less covert).
Considering a signal with an unknown code and very short
bit duration (e.g. P(Y) W-code bit), the degrees of freedom
for the attacker to be able to generate an undetectable aligned
spoofing signal with the correct code are very limited.
A. P(Y) acquisition with reduced search space
The first technique we propose consists in exploiting the
semi-codeless tracking methods to obtain an estimate of the
received W code, and to verify the consistency of the P(Y)
code phase and carrier frequency with the C/A one. The
concept is shown in Fig. 4. The digitized signal is acquired
and tracked using the C/A component. The output of the
tracking loop is used to wipeoff both ranging codes (C/A
and P) and the result is filtered to reduce noise. Then, the
carrier phase is removed using the PLL output. The only
component left in the signal is the W code. Integrating at the
W code rate and using an estimator (e.g. the MAP estimator
discussed in the SCER section) allows to recover the secret
W bits. Due to the independence of the cryptographical bits,
no processing gain can be leveraged and thus there is no
advantage in using longer integration time, thus each bit can
be estimated independently. If the estimation is performed
independently for each W chip, selecting the combination with
the maximum energy detected among all the combinations
used, this becomes a semi-coherent integration that provides
advantage over a non-coherent integration [17]. Clearly, the
reliability of the estimation depends on the C/N0, the antenna
gain, the estimator used and the noise figure of the receiver.
1) W Code Coherence: When a W bit sequence estimation
is available, it is passed to a detector that compares the
estimation coming from different tracking loops locked on
different correlation peaks in order to verify if all the tracked
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Figure 4: Proposed autonomous anti-spoofing scheme.
replicas are modulated by the same secret spreading code for
that PRN. In order to compare between two estimations the
cross-correlation is computed. We can distinguish three cases:
(a) both the signals are authentic, e.g. LOS and multipath
of the authentic signal: in this case the cross-correlation
should show a correlation peak.
(b) both the signal are spoofed, e.g. LOS and multipath of
the spoofed signal: even in this case the cross-correlation
should show a correlation peak, rendering the detection
ineffective. For this reason we assume that at least one of
the peak corresponds to an authentic signal.
(c) one signal is authentic and one signal is spoofed.
In order to discriminate between case (a) and (c), a
characterization of the cross-correlation result is needed. Due
to the independence of the W bits, a multibit statistic is just
an extension of the single bit one. Let us denote by p the
equivalent BER of the receiver, and by q the equivalent BER
of the attacker. These include the channel effects, the antenna
gain and the estimation strategy.
Let be x the random variable that represent the product
of two W bit estimation. For the sake of simplicity we can
assume a hard detection estimation that represent a pessimistic
assumption for the performance. The probability mass density
(pmd) of x when both the signals are legitimate px|ll(a) and
when a signal is legitimate and the other one is spoofed px|ls(a)
can be written as:
px|ll(a) =
{
p2 + (1− p)2 a = 1
2p(1− p) a = −1
px|ls(a) =
{
p2q + q(p− 1)2 + 2p(p− 1)(q − 1) a = 1
(p− 1)2(1− q) + p2(1− q) + 2pq(1− p) a = −1
The detection strategy for determining between the two cases
is a hypothesis testing problem based on the cross-correlation
of the two estimations:
y =
N∑
n=1
xn
This sum is a random variable itself and it is possible to write
it as the sum of two Gaussian variables:
N+ =
N∑
n=1
χ{xn = 1}
∼ N (Npx|z(1), Npx|z(1)px|z(−1))
N− =
N∑
n=1
χ{xn = −1}
∼ N (Npx|z(−1), Npx|z(−1)px|z(1))
py|z(a) ' N+ −N− = N − 2N−
where z can be ll or ls. The Kullback-Leibler (K-L) divergence
between two Gaussian distributions N (νa, σ2a) and N (νb, σ2b )
is given by
D(a, b) = log
(
σa
σb
)
+
(
σ2a + (µa − µb)2
2σ2b
)
− 1
2
When deriving D(py|ll, py|ls) and D(py|ls, py|ll), is seen that
as p→ 0.5 both divergences are close to 0 irrespective of q.
For p→ 1, the distinguishability depends on q: for q close to
0.5 it is very easy to detect the attack, while for q close to 1
it is more difficult.
It is possible to select the target p, q and compute the outer
bound in the detection probability using the Likelihood Ratio
Test (LRT), that is the strategy that yields the minimum pmd
for any given constraint on pfa, and vice versa [18, §3.3] [19]
if both the statistics of the legitimate and spoofed signal are
known (i.e. if the victim is aware of the particular strategy
adopted by the spoofer). If the spoofer strategy is not known, a
Generalized LRT (GLRT) strategy shall be used but will lead
to worse results.
Based on the BER of both the attacker and the receiver, it is
possible to find the minimum observation time to achieve the
desired performance in terms of false alarm probability pfa and
of missed detection probability pmd. The bigger the attacker
advantage over the victim receiver, the longer the necessary
minimum observation time, which in turn leads to a longer
Time Between Authentications (TBA).
An example is reported in Fig. 5, for (a) p = 0.75, q =
0.9 and (b) p = 0.55, q = 0.9. It is evident that when the
attacker advantage is limited, the detection mechanism requires
a short observation time; while when his advantage increases
the receiver needs to accumulate more W chips, requiring a
much longer time before being able to distinguish between the
authentic and spoofed signals. An advantage of working with
the W secret code is that due to its high rate of 511,5 Kbit/s,
the 6 Mbit taken into account correspond to an observation
period slightly shorter than 12 seconds.
In this section a detection statistic between two peaks was
presented. The extension to a detection statistic that takes into
account distorted (or multiple) auto-correlation peaks, possibly
achieving better results by leveraging more signal features
(e.g. correspondence to a multipath model), is left for future
work.
2) P(Y) Acquisition: When a sufficiently long W sequence is
estimated (in the order of tens of milliseconds), a second check
can be performed. This check is a direct P(Y) acquisition. At
this stage, the receiver has achieved a good time synchroniza-
tion and knows which W sequence shall be used to build the
local replica, thus there is no need to perform the acquisition
over a big search space, and the computational complexity
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Figure 5: Outer bound of achievable performance for different
p, q and observation time. q = 0.9, while p = 0.55 for solid
lines and p = 0.75 for dashed lines.
can be reduced. On the other hand, a larger search space,
improves the anti-spoofing performance. A tradeoff between
the search space dimension and the search resolution shall be
found. Moreover, the time required to perform this acquisition
is not critical and can take up to some seconds, alleviating the
computational requirement. Clearly, the performance depends
on the BER on the W code estimation, and the worse the
estimation performance, the longer the required integration
time to achieve the desired detection capability.
The output of the acquisition stage are three measures:
estimated carrier frequency, estimated code phase, and the
number of correlation peaks. Two types of checks can be
performed on these outputs. The first check is on the number
of correlation peaks and on their relative position. If the signal
is LOS, only one peak should be found. If LOS and multipath
are present, secondary smaller delayed peaks can be found.
The presence of two strong peaks very distant from each other,
may indicate a meaconing attack. The estimated code phase
and carrier frequency can be compared with the one obtained
from the C/A acquisition in order to check the coherence of
the measures. A mismatch may also indicate a spoofing attack.
The value of the correlation peak can also be compared to
that of the C/A in order to check the coherence with the fixed
power relationship.
B. Estimation of residual energy
A second way to exploit semi-codeless tracking techniques
is an iterative estimation and removal process.
The carrier-phase measurements are typically used in sur-
veying applications due to the improved accuracy that they
achieve with respect to code-phase measurements. Indeed, code-
phase measurements are more affected by multipath and are in
general much more noisier measurements. For these reasons,
a second integrity check can be performed comparing carrier-
phase measurements obtained from a different iteration of the
processing.
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Figure 6: Proposed autonomous anti-spoofing scheme.
The scheme is shown in Fig. 6. The initial part of the
processing is equivalent to the one proposed in Fig. 4. After
the carrier wipeoff, besides the W code, other terms such as
multipath or a spoofed signal are also present in the signal.
Recognizing this, the processing is repeated on this residual
energy. If the receiver is tracking a spoofed C/A signal, the
residual energy will contain the non spoofed C/A and P(Y),
which will be coherent between them. As an example, we can
think of a P code aided squaring (also known as semi-codeless
squaring) and to use long coherent integration time to obtain
a low noise estimation of the Doppler frequency.
In the ideal case of LOS and of perfect tracking by the first
tracking loop, no signal is present after the wipeoff, so the
second tracking loop should not be able to acquire and track
the signal. If the receiver is under spoofing attack, the second
tracking loop should acquire and track a signal. The estimated
Doppler frequency shall be different form the first one, as
indeed the spoofed is trying to influence the PVT computation
of the receiver by changing the ranging. If there is multipath,
the second tracking loop should be able to acquire and track a
signal.
This approach suffers from an important drawback: the
estimation (even more in the case of squaring) introduces some
interference into the remaining part of the signal. These terms
will also include cross-correlation terms, and this may degrade
the sensitivity of the scheme. This issue is even more evident
if a codeless technique is applied, because the goal of the
detection is to distinguish the Doppler frequency of all the
legitimate SVs in view from possible unknown spoofing terms.
On the other hand, even if suffering from squaring losses,
the receiver complexity is reduced with respect to relative to
the semi-coherent estimation of the W code presented in the
Section III. For these reasons the determination of an optimal
detection strategy is postponed to future work.
V. CONCLUSION
The article, after introducing the predominant cryptographic
anti-spoofing techniques such as NMA and SCE, has shown
through some experimental results the feasibility of SCER
attacks against GPS C/A using inexpensive hardware. This
motivates the use of SCE techniques to protect against spoofing;
however, in order to avoid the burden of key management, an
adaptation of semi-codeless receiver techniques was presented,
such that the method is independent of the cryptographic
mechanism employed. A feasibility study on the usage of
this approach was presented. Derivation of the optimal semi-
codeless based anti-spoofing techniques and the verification
with real-world scenarios is left for future work.
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